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Abstract	
Network	Function	Virtualization	(NFV)	promises	
the	 benefits	 of	 reduced	 infrastructure,	
personnel,	 and	 management	 costs	 by	
outsourcing	network	middleboxes	to	the	public	
or	private	cloud.	Unfortunately,	running	network	
functions	in	the	cloud	entails	security	challenges,	
especially	for	complex	stateful	services.	
In	this	paper,	we	describe	our	experiences	with	
hardening	the	“king	of	middleboxes”–	Intrusion	
Detection	Systems	(IDS)	–	using	Intel®	Software	
Guard	 Extensions	 (Intel®	 SGX)	 technology.	 Our	
IDS	secured	using	Intel®	SGX,	called	SEC-IDS,	is	an	
unmodified	Snort®	3	with	a	DPDK	network	layer	
that	 achieves	 10Gbps	 line	 rate.	 SEC-IDS	
guarantees	 computational	 integrity	 by	 running	
all	Snort®	code	inside	an	Intel®	SGX	enclave.	At	
the	 same	 time,	 SEC-IDS	 achieves	 near-native	
performance,	with	throughput	close	to	100%	of	
vanilla	Snort®	3,	by	retaining	network	I/O	outside	
of	 the	 enclave.	 Our	 experiments	 indicate	 that	
performance	is	only	constrained	by	the	modest	
Enclave	 Page	 Cache	 size	 available	 on	 current	
Intel®	 SGX	 Skylake	 based	 E3	 Xeon	 platforms.	
Finally,	 we	 kept	 the	 porting	 effort	 minimal	 by	
using	the	Graphene-SGX	library	OS:	only	27	Lines	
of	Code	(LoC)	were	modified	in	Snort®	and	178	
LoC	in	Graphene-SGX	itself.	
	
1. Introduction	
Network	 Function	 Virtualization	 (NFV)	 is	 a	
growing	 trend	 to	 move	 middleboxes	 such	 as	
switches,	 load-balancers,	 and	 firewalls	 from	
private	networks	 into	the	cloud	[1].	This	allows	
companies	 to	 significantly	 reduce	 their	
infrastructure	 costs	 and	 ease	 resource	
management.	The	conundrum,	however,	is	how	
to	 protect	 confidentiality	 and	 integrity	 of	
network	functions	once	they	are	outsourced	to	a	
possibly	adversarial	cloud	[2].	
Adding	 protections	 to	 outsourced	 network	
functions	 is	 no	 easy	 task.	 To	 highlight	 its	
complexity,	 we	 focus	 on	 the	 “king	 of	
middleboxes”	 –	 Intrusion	 Detection	 Systems	
(IDS’s)	 –	 and	 discuss	 how	 current	 research	
efforts	 fail	 to	 protect	 them.	 In	 particular,	 we	
dissect	 Snort3	 –	 the	most	 popular	 and	mature	
open-source	IDS	[3].	
First,	 IDS’s	 are	 complex	 software	 systems	 that	
detect	 network	 attacks	 by	 analyzing	 all	 traffic	
against	 a	 set	 of	 signature-,	 protocol-,	 and	
anomaly-based	 rules.	 For	 example,	 Snort®	
decodes	network	packets,	reassembles	streams,	
maintains	flow	states,	runs	them	through	a	string	
of	 protocol-	 and	 application-specific	 detectors,	
performs	complex	pattern	matching,	and	signals	
alarms	 on	 suspicious	 traffic.	 Unfortunately,	
state-of-the-art	 crypto-scheme	 solutions	 for	
securing	middleboxes	 such	 as	 BlindBox	 [4]	 and	
Embark	 [5]	 cannot	 support	 this	 rich	 IDS	
functionality.	
Second,	due	to	the	aforementioned	complexity	
of	IDS’s,	it	 is	undesirable	to	build	a	new	system	
from	scratch	or	to	introduce	intrusive	changes	in	
the	existing	codebase.	Snort®	has	 seven	 library	
dependencies,	with	1	million	LoC	of	C/C++	code;	
rewriting	 or	 modifying	 it	 for	 security	 purposes	
would	be	too	time-consuming	and	error-prone.	
This	 requirement	 for	 legacy	 code	 support	
renders	the	whole	middlebox-framework	line	of	
research	[6–9]	unsuitable	for	IDS’s.	
Third,	 IDS’s	must	 sustain	 high	 line	 rates	 of	 10-
40Gbps,	 e.g.,	 a	 typical	 deployment	 of	 Snort®	
spawns	 many	 threads	 to	 achieve	 desired	
throughput.	 This	 requirement	 is	 at	 odds	 with	
software-based	 cryptographic	 solutions	 that	
inevitably	degrade	performance	[4,5].	The	better	
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alternative	 is	 to	 use	 hardware	 support	 such	 as	
Intel®	 SGX	 [10]	 that	 provides	 integrity	 and	
confidentiality	guarantees	to	applications	while	
maintaining	acceptable	performance.	
These	three	requirements	dictated	our	approach	
to	harden	IDS’s	for	security	with	the	example	of	
Snort®.	To	side	step	the	complexity	of	Snort®,	we	
put	its	entire	functionality	inside	the	Intel®	SGX	
enclave	 and	 require	 (almost)	 no	 code	
modifications.	 For	 performance,	 we	 keep	 the	
DPDK	 packet	 acquisition	 layer	 and	 the	 packets	
themselves	 outside	 of	 the	 enclave	 and	 feed	
pointers	 to	 them	 to	 Snort®	 via	 lockless	 ring	
buffers.	We	call	the	final	system	SEC-IDS.	
The	porting	effort	was	kept	minimal	by	using	the	
Graphene-SGX	library	OS	[11]:	only	27	LoC	were	
modified	 in	 Snort®	 and	 1,205	 LoC	 in	 the	DPDK	
layer.	 We	 also	 resolved	 minor	 challenges	 of	
Snort®-DPDK	separation	and	trusted	clocks	along	
the	 way,	 leading	 to	 178	 changed	 LoC	 in	
Graphene-SGX.	
Our	 evaluation	 shows	 that	 SEC-IDS	 achieves	
near-native	 speed	 on	 workloads	 where	 Snort®	
state	 fits	 into	 Intel®	 SGX’s	 Enclave	 Page	 Cache	
(EPC),	with	throughput	close	to	100%	of	vanilla	
Snort®.	 Larger	 workload	 sizes	 can	 be	
accommodated	 with	 future	 versions	 of	 Intel®	
SGX,	where	the	EPC	size	is	expected	to	grow.	
In	 this	 work,	 we	 describe	 the	 challenges	 of	
achieving	 near-native	 performance	 for	 Intel®	
SGX-hardened	 IDS	 (or	 indeed	 any	 high-
performant	 complex	 application)	 as	 well	 as	
justify	 our	 design	 choices.	 In	 particular,	 we	
provide	guidelines	on	cleanly	separating	trusted	
and	untrusted	parts	of	the	application	and	avoid	
expensive	system	calls.	
2. Background	
Intel®	 SGX.	 The	 Intel®	 Software	 Guard	
Extensions	 (SGX)	 is	 an	 ISA	extension	 for	 recent	
Intel®	 CPUs	 that	 provides	 confidentiality	 and	
integrity	 protections	 for	 sensitive	 parts	 of	
applications	[10].	With	Intel®	SGX,	the	code	and	
data	to	be	protected	are	put	inside	an	Intel®	SGX	
enclave	–	a	region	of	memory	that	is	opaque	to	
all	 other	 software	 including	 privileged	
OS/hypervisor.	The	code	inside	the	enclave	can	
execute	 almost	 all	 CPU	 instructions	 (see	
important	 exceptions	 below)	 and	 can	 access	
data	 both	 inside	 and	 outside	 of	 enclave.	 Any	
attempt	to	access	enclave	data	from	outside	of	
the	enclave	fails.	
At	 the	 hardware	 level,	 a	 handful	 of	 new	 x86	
instructions	were	 introduced	 to	 initialize,	 start,	
resume,	 and	 exit	 an	 enclave.	When	 in	 enclave	
mode,	 the	 CPU	 disallows	 context	 switches	 to	
kernel	(i.e.,	`syscall`	and	`int`	instructions).	Thus,	
when	an	interrupt	or	a	system	call	happens,	an	
enclave	 is	 first	 exited,	 the	 interrupt/syscall	 is	
handled	 by	 the	 kernel,	 and	 the	 enclave	 is	
resumed.	 Since	an	enclave	exit	 is	 an	expensive	
operation,	 this	 execution	 pattern	 leads	 to	 high	
performance	overheads	[12,13].	
Another	 currently	 unsupported	 instruction	 is	
`rdtsc`,	 the	 low-overhead	 relative	 time	 source	
[14,15].	 Unfortunately,	 a	 lot	 of	 real-world	
software	 relies	 on	 this	 instruction,	 usually	
through	 library	 or	 system	 calls	 such	 as	
`gettimeofday`	 and	 `clock_gettime`.	 The	 usual	
(but	 not	 secure!)	 workaround	 is	 to	 exit	 the	
enclave	 on	 `rdtsc`,	 execute	 the	 instruction	 in	
untrusted	code,	and	pass	the	result	back	to	the	
enclave	[11].	Similar	to	syscalls,	this	can	result	in	
high	 overheads	 if	 the	 application	 uses	 `rdtsc`	
extensively.	
To	 achieve	 confidentiality	 and	 integrity	 of	
enclave	data,	the	hardware	is	augmented	with	a	
Memory	 Encryption	 Engine	 (MEE)	 and	 the	
Enclave	 Page	 Cache	 (EPC).	 The	 EPC	 is	 a	
designated	area	in	physical	memory	inaccessible	
to	 any	 software	 other	 than	 the	 corresponding	
enclave.	All	data	transferred	from	CPU	to	EPC	is	
encrypted	 with	 a	 key	 associated	 with	 this	
particular	 CPU,	 and	 decrypted	 in	 another	
direction.	
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with	 only	 96MB	 available	 for	 user	 data,	 and	
enclaves	 exceeding	 this	 amount	 require	
expensive	 Intel®	 SGX-aware	 paging	mechanism	
that	 securely	 swaps	 enclave	 pages	 to	 RAM.	
Because	 of	 MEE	 encryption	 and	 EPC	 paging,	
enclaves	experience	two	sources	of	overhead:	1-
10X	overhead	when	data	leaves	LLC	and	2-2000X	
when	it	leaves	EPC	[12].	Thus,	it	is	important	to	
keep	 enclave	 code	 and	 data	 to	 a	minimum,	 at	
least	on	current	SGX	servers	[7,13,16].	
Other	 parts	 constituting	 the	 SGX	 technology,	
such	as	remote	attestation,	are	not	relevant	for	
this	 paper,	 and	 we	 refer	 the	 reader	 to	 Intel®	
manuals	and	other	sources	[10].	
Graphene-SGX.	 Graphene-SGX	 is	 a	 library	 OS	
tailored	 to	 Intel®	 SGX	 environments	 [11].	 It	
allows	 running	 unmodified	 applications	 by	
providing	 a	 runtime	 to	 transparently	 exit	 the	
enclave	 and	 resume	 it	 on	 system	 calls,	
unsupported	 instructions,	 and	 interrupts.	 To	
provide	 additional	 security	 against,	 e.g.,	 Iago	
attacks	[17],	Graphene-SGX	introduces	shields	–	
sophisticated	 checks	 at	 the	 enclave-untrusted	
app	interface.	
Features	 that	 distinguish	 Graphene-SGX	 from	
similar	 shielded	 execution	 frameworks	
[12,14,18]	 include	shielded	dynamic	loading	(to	
support	 dynamically	 loaded	 libraries	 and	 run-
time	linking),	multi-process	abstractions,	and	file	
authentication.	For	security,	a	so-called	manifest	
file	is	required	with	a	whitelist	of	trusted	libraries	
and	 files	 that	 can	be	used	with	Graphene-SGX.	
These	 libraries	 and	 files	 are	 also	 hashed,	 and	
Graphene-SGX	 checks	 that	 the	 runtime	
calculated	hash	 is	equal	 to	the	one	specified	 in	
the	manifest.	
Akin	 to	 other	 frameworks,	 Graphene-SGX	
supports	multithreaded	applications	(using	a	1:1	
threading	model),	exception	handling,	and	a	set	
of	 28	 Linux	 system	 calls.	 Graphene-SGX	
																																								 																				
1	http://dpdk.org/	
overheads	 are	 modest,	 with	 25%	 lower	
throughput	w.r.t.	native	for	web	applications.	
Intel®	 DPDK.	 Intel®	 DPDK	 is	 a	 framework	 for	
high-speed	network	packet	acquisition.1	It	relies	
on	recent	advances	in	NIC	hardware	and	copies	
network	packet	contents	directly	into	user	space	
memory,	 completely	 bypassing	 the	 kernel	
network	 stack.	DPDK	also	 leverages	HugePages	
for	efficient	memory	management	and	reduced	
TLB	 pressure.	 This	 design	 allows	 achieving	 10-
40Gbps	throughput	in	software	middleboxes.	
DPDK	consists	of	a	set	of	libraries	that	are	linked	
into	 the	 user	 application.	 For	 this	 paper,	 the	
main	libraries	are	Environment	Abstraction	Layer	
(EAL),	 `mbuf`,	 and	 `ring`.	 EAL	 abstracts	 away	
bootstrapping	 details	 of	 underlying	 NIC	
hardware	 and	 drivers	 as	 well	 as	 memory	 and	
thread	management.	The	`mbuf`	library	defines	
structures	 and	 functions	 to	 store	 and	 analyze	
network	 packets	 (DPDK	 does	 not	 use	 Linux	
kernel	structures).	The	`ring`	library	provides	the	
abstraction	of	an	RTE	ring	–	a	lockless	fixed-size	
FIFO	queue	of	pointers,	which	 is	primarily	used	
for	passing	references	to	network	packets.	
Snort®	 IDS.	 Snort®	 is	 an	 Intrusion	 Detection	
System	 (IDS)	 that	 fetches	 packets	 from	 the	
network,	 preprocesses	 and	 analyzes	 them	 for	
malicious	traffic	[3].	In	case	an	attack	signature	is	
detected,	Snort®	can	either	block	the	packet	(if	
serving	 as	 a	 firewall)	 or	 generate	 an	 alert	 for	
system	administrator.	
Figure	1	shows	the	high-level	overview	of	Snort®	
functionality.	 Each	 packet	 from	 the	 network	 is	
decoded	to	determine	the	“protocol	–	source	IP	
Figure	1:	Snort®	IDS	workflow.	
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–	source	port	–	destination	IP	–	destination	port”	
5-tuple;	 also,	 the	 protocol	 fields	 are	 examined	
for	sanity.	The	decoding	phase	is	stateless.	
Next,	 TCP	 packets	 are	 grouped	 by	 live	
connections	 (flows)	 and	 TCP	 streams	 are	
reassembled	 for	 convenience	 of	 subsequent	
detection	modules.2	At	this	point,	lists	of	all	live	
flows	and	pending	segments-to-reassemble	are	
maintained.	This	constitutes	Snort®’s	state.	
After	 this	 preprocessing,	 the	 actual	 attack	
detection	 is	 invoked.	 Each	 packet	 payload	 is	
analyzed	using	two-phase	pattern	matching:	first	
a	 simple	 search	 against	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 is	
performed.	For	 rules	 that	matched,	 the	second	
heavyweight	phase	checks	whether	the	payload	
contains	 a	 full	 attack	 signature,	 with	 regular	
expressions	and	flow-specific	options.	The	set	of	
rules	 is	 defined	 in	 a	 separate	 file	 and	
preprocessed	 at	 Snort®	 startup.	 We	 discuss	
Snort®	rules	in	more	detail	in	Appendix	1.	
Finally,	if	an	attack	signature	is	matched,	an	alert	
is	generated	and	output	in	the	console	or	logged	
in	a	file.	If	Snort®	is	configured	in	inline	(firewall)	
mode,	 it	can	also	block	the	offending	packet.	 If	
packet	 is	 innocuous,	 Snort®	 allows	 the	 packet	
and	pushes	it	back	to	network	(if	in	inline	mode).	
Snort®	development	 started	 in	1998,	and	since	
then	 the	 system	 incorporated	 numerous	
features	and	became	the	most	widely	used	IDS.	
Snort®	3	aka	Snort®++	is	a	major	rewrite	of	the	
original	codebase	done	in	C++;	we	use	this	new	
version	 in	 the	 paper.	 Figure	 2	 presents	 the	
overall	architecture	of	Snort®	3.	
Snort®	 is	 multithreaded,	 following	 the	 “one-
thread-do-all”	 model.	 Each	 worker	 thread	
operates	in	an	infinite	event	loop:	it	fetches	the	
next	packet	from	the	network,	preprocesses	and	
analyzes	 it	 as	 described	 above,	 and	 outputs	
alerts.	Worker	threads	are	specifically	designed	
																																								 																				
2	 Actually,	 Snort®	 keeps	 track	 of	 connections	 even	 for	 stateless	
protocols	like	UDP	and	ICMP,	but	we	skip	these	details.	
to	share	no	state	for	performance	reasons.	This	
design	 dictates	 that	 the	 same	 network	 flow	
(characterized	by	a	5-tuple)	must	be	processed	
by	the	same	thread;	bidirectional	 flows	require	
special	treatment.	
Due	to	abundance	of	 features,	Snort®	adopts	a	
pluggable	architecture	and	uses	dynamic	loading	
and	 linking	 extensively.	 It	 has	 seven	 library	
dependencies,	 one	 of	 which	 is	 linked	 statically	
(LibDAQ)	and	others	dynamically.	Preprocessing,	
analysis,	and	logging	modules	can	be	written	as	
shared-library	or	Lua-script	plugins	and	loaded	at	
startup.	 Snort®’s	 configuration	 file	 specifies	
which	modules	and	plugins	to	use	as	well	as	their	
specific	 settings.	 Due	 to	 all	 these	 features,	 the	
codebase	 of	 Snort®	 with	 all	 dependencies	
consists	of	1	million	LoC	in	C/C++	as	reported	by	
cloc.3	
Of	particular	interest	to	us	is	the	LibDAQ	library	
for	 network	 packet	 acquisition.	 LibDAQ	 clearly	
separates	the	fetching	of	packets	from	NIC	and	
actual	 Snort®	 processing.	 LibDAQ’s	 default	
network	 library	 is	 PCAP	 (libpcap)	 –	 a	 platform-
independent	 interface	 to	 capture	 packets	 in	
user-space.	Due	to	its	reliance	on	kernel	support	
and	 interrupt-driven	 network	 I/O,	 it	 cannot	
handle	 data	 rates	 of	 10-40Gbps.	 Alas,	 LibDAQ	
does	not	provide	an	official	DPDK	module	as	of	
this	writing.	
3. Threat	Model	and	Security	Properties	
We	 assume	 a	 threat	 model	 where	 the	 only	
trusted	 entities	 are	 the	 CPU	 and	 the	 code	
3	https://github.com/AlDanial/cloc	
	
Figure	2:	Original	Snort®	architecture.		
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executing	 in	 an	 SGX	 enclave,	 similar	 to	 other	
papers	[11–14,16,18].	All	other	unprivileged	and	
privileged	 software	 including	 the	 OS	 and	 the	
hypervisor	 is	 potentially	 malicious.	 Physical	
attacks	 on	 RAM,	 memory	 bus,	 or	 network	
interface	are	also	possible.	Denial-of-service	and	
side-channel	 attacks	 (including	 network	 side	
channels)	[19,20]	are	out	of	scope.	
The	assets	we	aim	to	protect	are	summarized	in	
Table	1.	 In	the	following,	we	provide	rationales	
for	the	proposed	levels	of	protection.	
(No)	 integrity	 and	 confidentiality	 of	 network	
traffic.	The	main	motivation	behind	this	work	is	
to	 demonstrate	 transparency,	 usability	 and	
performance	 benefits	 of	 Intel®	 SGX,	 thus	 we	
concentrate	on	immediate	security	benefits	that	
Intel®	 SGX	 technology	 and	 Graphene-SGX	
framework	 provide	 out-of-the-box.	 For	 this	
reason,	 we	 do	 not	 target	 confidentiality	 of	
network	traffic,	where	all	traffic	passing	through	
the	 middlebox	 is	 encrypted	 but	 still	 correctly	
processed.	This	property	is	not	trivial	to	achieve	
for	an	IDS	like	Snort®	that	expects	packets	in	the	
clear.	 In	theory,	packets	could	arrive	encrypted	
and	 then	 be	 decrypted	 by	 Snort®	 before	
processing,	 but	 such	 a	 setup	 would	 require	
provisioning	all	session	keys	to	Snort®,	which	is	
infeasible.	
We	 also	 do	 not	 aim	 to	 protect	 integrity	 of	
network	 packets.	 The	 attacker	 can	 drop	 or	
rearrange	 packets	 as	 well	 as	 inject	 malicious	
packets	or	modify	parts	of	the	true	ones	(since	in	
																																								 																				
4	For	a	network	attack	to	succeed,	the	attacker	needs	access	to	a	
physical	 device	 or	 powerful	 OS	 privileges.	 This	 can	 be	 easily	
our	 scenario	 traffic	 is	 in	 plain	 text).	 A	 low-cost	
weak-security	 solution	 would	 be	 to	 install	 a	
simple	 statistics-collecting	 middlebox	 at	 user’s	
premises	 and	 compare	 against	 statistics	
collected	by	enclavised	Snort®.	However,	 there	
is	no	general	way	to	protect	integrity	of	packets:	
a	powerful	network	attacker	can	simply	modify	
incoming	 or	 outgoing	 packets	 before	 or	 after	
Snort®	inspection.4	
Integrity	 of	 execution	 and	 configuration.	 We	
aim	 to	 protect	 integrity	 of	 execution	 (aka	
computational	 integrity)	 of	 Snort®:	 the	 user	 is	
assured	 that	 Snort®	 runs	 correctly	with	 correct	
configuration	 and	 set	 of	 rules.	 This	 is	 useful	 to	
verify	 functionality	 and	 performance	 of	 Snort®	
for	 audit	 purposes.	 In	 addition,	 Intel®	 SGX	
protects	the	confidentiality	of	the	internal	state	
of	 Snort®	 including	 metadata,	 flows,	 and	
streams.	Note	that	it	is	trivial	to	add	support	for	
confidentiality	 of	 rules	 and	 configuration	 by	
providing	 encrypted	 rules/configuration	 files	
and	 decrypting	 them	 inside	 an	 enclave	 with	 a	
securely	provisioned	key.	
System	 call	 interface.	 The	 OS	 can	 potentially	
launch	attacks	on	the	enclave	using	the	system	
call	 interface,	 i.e.,	 Iago	 attacks	 [17].	 The	
Graphene-SGX	 framework	 already	 provides	
shields	for	28	most	commonly	used	system	calls,	
but,	 as	we	will	 see,	 Snort®	 relies	 on	 additional	
syscalls	 for	 correct	 functioning.	 Thus,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	carefully	examine	the	semantics	of	
detected,	 unlike	 more	 subtle	 attacks	 on	 Snort®	 that	 we	 try	 to	
prevent	in	this	work.	
Figure	3:	Architecture	of	SEC-IDS.		
Asset	 Protection	
Snort®	execution	 Integrity	
Snort®	state	 (flows,	
streams,	metadata)	
Integrity	and	confidentiality	
Snort®	
configuration	 and	
rules	
Integrity	 and	 possibly	 confidentiality	
(need	securely	provisioned	keys)	
Network	traffic	 Out	of	scope	
Table	1:	Snort®’s	assets	considered	for	protection.		
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these	 syscalls.	 We	 revisit	 this	 requirement	 in	
Section	4.	
4. Architecture	
Our	architectural	goal	is	to	run	Snort®	inside	an	
Intel®	 SGX	 enclave	 with	 near-native	
performance	and	minimal	 changes	 to	 the	 code	
base.	To	accomplish	 this,	we	chose	the	path	of	
iterative	refinement,	first	putting	all	Snort®	code	
inside	the	enclave	and	then	adding	features	one	
by	one.	After	five	iterations,	we	came	up	with	the	
final	architecture	presented	on	Figure	3.	 In	 the	
following,	 we	 discuss	 encountered	 challenges	
and	our	solutions.	
Challenge	1:	Snort®	and	its	dependencies	inside	
enclave.	As	 a	 first	 step,	we	 needed	 to	 port	 all	
Snort®	 functionality,	 including	 library	
dependencies	 and	 loadable	 plugins,	 inside	 an	
enclave	with	minimum	effort.	
A	naïve	solution	would	be	to	use	the	Intel®	SGX	
Software	 Development	 Kit	 (SDK).5	 The	 SDK	
provides	 building	 blocks	 to	 create,	 run,	 and	
attest	enclaves,	 seal	data	 to	be	 stored	on	disk,	
and	 tools	 to	 develop	 ECALL/OCALL	 enclave	
interfaces.	Even	though	the	SDK	can	be	used	to	
port	 complex	 existing	 applications,	 the	manual	
effort	 to	 define	 all	 required	 interfaces	 and	 to	
modify	the	original	code	base	is	significant	(e.g.,	
11,078	LoC	of	changes	in	SGX-Tor)	[21].	Manually	
porting	huge	 code	bases	 is	 known	 to	be	error-
prone,	 leading	 to	 new	 vulnerabilities	 and	
negating	 the	 promise	 of	 Intel®	 SGX-enabled	
security.	
The	 appropriate	 solution	 is	 to	 use	 a	 shielded	
execution	framework	that	hides	the	complexity	
of	adjusting	applications	to	enclaves.	There	is	a	
number	 of	 frameworks	 to	 choose	 from:	Haven	
[14],	 Graphene-SGX	 [11],	 SCONE	 [12],	 and	
Panoply	 [18].	 Haven	 is	 an	 early	 closed-sourced	
Windows-based	Library	OS	 system	with	a	 large	
																																								 																				
5	https://software.intel.com/en-us/sgx-sdk	
210MB	 memory	 footprint.	 Graphene-SGX	 is	 a	
Library	 OS	 for	 Linux	 applications	 with	 a	 much	
smaller	 TCB.	 SCONE	and	Panoply	decrease	TCB	
even	further	but	do	not	support	dynamic	linking	
and	loading	required	by	Snort®.	In	fact,	SCONE’s	
features	 of	 user-level	 threading	 and	
asynchronous	 syscalls	 are	 ineffective	 in	 the	
Snort®	 +	DPDK	 case:	 Snort®	 invokes	no	 system	
calls	 during	 normal	 execution	 (except	
`clock_gettime`	 that	 we	 discuss	 next).	 Lastly,	
Panoply	 prioritizes	 minimal	 TCB	 over	
performance	and	thus	exhibits	higher	overheads	
than	Graphene-SGX.	
Ultimately,	we	settled	on	Graphene-SGX	since	it	
perfectly	 aligns	 with	 Snort®’s	 requirements:	 it	
supports	dynamic	linking	and	loading,	OS	signals,	
1:1	multithreading,	 and	 file	 authentication.	 On	
top	 of	 this,	 Graphene-SGX	 provides	 high	
performance	 and	 strong	 security	 via	 syscalls’	
shields.	
Even	 with	 Graphene-SGX,	 porting	 Snort®	
required	 some	 code	 and	 build-system	
modifications.	 We	 encountered	 three	 minor	
issues:	
(i)	 The	 hwloc	 library	 –	 to	 set	 affinity	 of	 Snort®	
worker	threads	for	better	performance	–	issues	
`sched_setaffinity`	 and	 `sched_getaffinity`	
system	calls.	The	kernel	 is	supposed	to	set	and	
get	a	CPU	affinity	mask,	but	there	 is	no	way	to	
prove	 correctness	of	 these	actions	 from	within	
the	 enclave.	 Thus,	 issuing	 these	 syscalls	 to	 a	
malicious	OS	 is	 at	 best	 futile	 and	 at	worst	 can	
trigger	 obscure	 application	 bugs	 (e.g.,	 Snort®	
assumed	that	`sched_getaffinity`	never	fails	and	
went	into	infinite	loop	when	we	tried	to	stub	the	
syscall	 with	 a	 dummy	 value).	 In	 the	 end,	 we	
decided	to	remove	the	hwloc	dependency	from	
Snort®	 altogether,	 patching	 27	 LoC	 in	 a	 single	
file.6	
6	This	was	the	only	change	we	made	in	Snort®	itself.	We	would	even	
argue	that	this	was	beneficial	for	SEC-IDS:	by	removing	hwloc,	we	
instantly	decreased	TCB	by	40,000	LoC.	
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(ii)	The	 luajit	 library	contains	an	embedded	Lua	
interpreter	 to	 parse	 Snort®’s	 configuration	 file	
and	 Lua-based	 plugins.	 The	 library	 uses	 a	 rare	
`MAP_32BIT`	 flag	 when	 allocating	 memory	 via	
`mmap`.	 This	 flag	 instructs	 the	 OS	 to	 allocate	
memory	 in	 first	 2GB	 of	 process	 address	 space,	
for	 outdated	 performance	 reasons.	 Graphene-
SGX	did	not	support	this	flag,	thus	we	introduced	
a	one-line	patch	to	Graphene	to	ignore	it	inside	
the	 enclave.	 Note	 that	 this	 change	 does	 not	
affect	 security	 since	 enclaves	 use	 their	 own	
memory	management	anyway.	
(iii)	 The	 libpcap	 library	 is	 used	 for	 user-level	
packet	capture	 in	 the	PCAP	 format.	 It	operates	
on	 so-called	 “raw	 sockets”	 to	 fetch	 IP	 packets.	
The	 only	 types	 of	 sockets	 Graphene-SGX	
supports	 are	 TCP/UDP,	 and	 adding	 shielding	
support	 for	 a	 too-powerful	 primitive	 like	 raw	
sockets	would	go	against	the	LibOS	philosophy.	
We	removed	libpcap	as	a	dependency	since	SEC-
IDS	 already	 uses	 the	 DPDK	 library	 residing	
outside	of	the	enclave	for	packet	acquisition.	
These	 were	 the	 only	 changes	 required	 to	 run	
Snort®	and	its	dependencies	inside	an	Intel®	SGX	
enclave.	
Challenge	 2:	 DPDK	 outside	 enclave.	 Our	 next	
challenge	was	 to	 provide	 an	 interface	 to	 allow	
communication	 between	 Snort®	 threads	 inside	
the	enclave	and	DPDK	threads	outside	of	it.	
We	 first	 need	 to	 explain	 our	 decision	 to	 leave	
DPDK	 (and	 LibDAQ	 for	 that	matter)	 outside	 of	
the	enclave.	After	all,	it	is	possible	to	have	DPDK	
code	and	state	inside	the	enclave.	However,	we	
see	 three	 problems	 with	 this	 design.	 First,	 it	
would	 still	 require	adding	 low-level	networking	
support	 to	 Graphene-SGX,	 similar	 to	 libpcap.	
Second,	putting	all	DPDK	code	–	113,000	LoC	–	
inside	 the	 enclave	 unnecessarily	 bloats	 TCB.	
Third,	 to	 store	 fetched	 packets,	 DPDK	 uses	
HugePages	 not	 supported	 by	 Intel®	 SGX,	 and	
																																								 																				
7	https://github.com/napatech/daq_dpdk_multiqueue	
there	 is	 little	 sense	 to	 protect	 DPDK	 code	 and	
metadata	while	the	packets	themselves	are	left	
in	untrusted	memory.	
As	of	this	writing,	there	is	no	official	support	for	
DPDK	 in	 Snort®	 3.	 Thus,	we	used	 a	 fork	 of	 the	
LibDAQ	 library	 with	 a	 DPDK	 module	 from	
Napatech.7	The	library	is	feature-rich	and	allows	
to	 correctly	 load-balance	 network	 flows	 across	
multiple	Snort®	threads,	using	the	Receive	Side	
Scaling	(RSS)	network	driver	technology	[22].	
The	original	design	of	this	DPDK	module	does	not	
suit	our	needs:	it	combines	DPDK	packet	fetching	
and	 Snort®	 processing	 in	 one	 thread	 (“one-
thread-do-all”	 model).	 In	 other	 words,	 each	
worker	 thread	 runs	 an	 infinite	 loop	with	 three	
steps:	 (1)	 receive	 packets	 from	 network	 in	 a	
burst,	 (2)	 run	 Snort®	 analysis	 on	each	 received	
packet,	 and	 (3)	 transmit	 each	 allowed	 packet	
back	to	network,	if	Snort®	is	in	inline	mode.	
Since	we	want	to	run	DPDK	code	outside	of	the	
enclave,	 we	 break	 this	 functionality	 into	 two	
parts	(compare	Figures	2	and	3).	We	designate	M	
“DPDK	 threads”	 that	 perform	 steps	 1	 and	 3	 as	
above.	However,	 instead	of	directly	calling	 into	
Snort®,	 each	 DPDK	 thread	 puts	 pointers	 to	
fetched	packets	in	a	RX	ring	and	gets	pointers	to	
allowed	packets	from	a	TX	ring,	if	in	inline	mode.	
A	second	set	of	N	“Snort®	threads”	perform	step	
2,	i.e.,	actual	Snort®	analysis.	Each	Snort®	thread	
gets	 the	 next	 available	 pointer	 from	 a	 RX	 ring,	
analyzes	 the	 packet	 pointed	 to,	 and	 puts	 the	
pointer	to	this	packet	in	a	TX	ring	if	the	packet	is	
allowed.	
RX	and	TX	rings	are	implemented	as	RTE	lockless	
rings	 and	 serve	 as	 a	 main	 communication	
channel	 between	 the	 enclavized	 Snort®	 and	
outside	DPDK.	 They	 are	 created	at	 startup	and	
allocated	 in	 unprotected	 HugePages	 memory.	
Note	 that	 these	 rings	 contain	 only	 pointers	 to	
packets	 (more	 precisely,	 to	 their	 `mbuf`	 DPDK	
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representations),	 allowing	 zero-copy	 packet	
analysis.	
There	 is	 one	 caveat	with	RX	 rings.	 Each	 Snort®	
thread	 operates	 on	 its	 own	 subset	 of	 network	
bidirectional	flows.	Thus,	we	cannot	use	a	single	
shared	 RX	 ring:	 all	 Snort®	 threads	 would	 read	
from	this	ring	in	no	particular	order	and	network	
flows	will	become	jumbled.	To	alleviate	this,	we	
create	 as	 many	 RX	 rings	 as	 there	 are	 Snort®	
threads.	 For	 every	 fetched	 packet,	 a	 DPDK	
thread	looks	into	the	last	six	bits	of	the	RSS	hash	
and	 maps	 them	 to	 the	 corresponding	 RX	 ring.	
Since	 all	 packets	 in	 the	 same	 network	 flow	
produce	the	same	RSS	hash,	they	end	up	in	only	
one	Snort®	thread.	
Pushing	 packets	 back	 to	 the	 network	 requires	
only	a	single	shared	TX	ring.	This	is	why	we	use	a	
Multiple	 Producer	Multiple	 Consumer	 (MPMC)	
TX	 ring,	 but	 allow	 Multiple	 Producer	 Single	
Consumer	(MPSC)	RX	rings.	
Figure	4	illustrates	the	interface	between	Snort®	
and	DPDK	threads	via	RX	and	TX	rings.	Note	that	
the	 rings	 contain	 pointers	 to	 `mbuf`	 objects,	
denoted	 with	 an	 apostrophe.	 Also	 note	 that	
Snort®	 sends	packets	via	TX	 ring	and	TX	queue	
only	in	inline	mode.	
Using	separate	DPDK	and	Snort®	threads	entails	
two	additional	benefits.	First,	since	each	of	these	
threads	 runs	 on	 a	 separate	 CPU	 core,	 the	 L1	
cache	 is	 less	 stressed	 than	 in	 the	 “one-thread-
do-all”	design.	Second,	our	experiments	indicate	
that	 a	 single	DPDK	 thread	 is	 enough	 to	 sustain	
10Gbps	network	load.	
Challenge	 3:	 Interfaces	 between	 Snort®	 and	
DPDK.	 There	 are	 two	 interfaces	 between	 the	
enclavized	Snort®	and	untrusted	DPDK:	(1)	RX/TX	
rings	to	pass	pointers	to	network	packets,	and	(2)	
OCALLs	 to	 initialize	 and	 shutdown	 LibDAQ	 and	
DPDK.		
The	interface	of	RX/TX	rings	was	described	in	the	
previous	 section.	 It	 is	 the	only	 interface	during	
run-time,	 with	 asynchronous	 “exitless”	
communication.	 This	 interface	 is	 what	 makes	
SEC-IDS	perform	on	par	with	vanilla	Snort®.	
For	 initialization	 and	 finalization	 of	 DPDK,	 SEC-
IDS	requires	another	interface	with	function	call	
invocations.	 In	 particular,	 we	 introduce	 five	
	
Figure	4:	Interface	between	Snort®	and	DPDK	threads	via	RX/TX	rings.		
OCALL	name	 Description	
dpdk_initialize	 Process	 command-line	 arguments,	
allocate	memory	for	packets	and	RX/TX	
rings,	initialize	EAL	
dpdk_start_device	 Set	up	RX	and	TX	queues	 for	Ethernet	
device,	 set	 RSS	 hash	 for	 bidirectional	
flows,	start	Ethernet	device	
dpdk_acquire	 Start	 infinite	 loop	 of	 DPDK	 threads:	
retrieve	burst	of	packets	from	network,	
pass	to	RX	ring,	read	from	TX	ring	and	
push	allowed	packets	back	to	network	
dpdk_stop	 Close	Ethernet	device	
dpdk_shutdown	 Close	 Ethernet	 device	 and	 free	 all	
allocated	memory	
Table	2:	OCALL	interface	between	Snort®	and	DPDK.		
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OCALLs	 from	 enclave	 to	 untrusted	 code	 (see	
Table	2).	
We	 manually	 add	 these	 OCALLs	 to	 Graphene-
SGX	 and	patch	 the	DPDK	module	 in	 LibDAQ	 to	
call	them.	The	typical	workflow	is	thus	as	follows	
(with	 the	 example	 of	 `dpdk_initialize`):	 (1)	
Snort®	 starts	 inside	 the	 enclave,	 (2)	 it	 calls	
LibDAQ	 initialization	 routine,	 (3)	 LibDAQ	
recognizes	that	it	is	inside	the	enclave	and	calls	
`ocall_dpdk_initialize`,	 (4)	 this	 OCALL	 exits	 the	
enclave,	 performs	 untrusted	 `dpdk_initialize`,	
and	resumes	enclave	execution.	
Note	that	we	link	LibDAQ	both	inside	and	outside	
of	 the	 enclave.	 The	 enclavized	 LibDAQ	 is	
compiled	to	serve	as	a	minimal	redirection	layer:	
it	 only	 invokes	 OCALLs.	 The	 outside	 LibDAQ	
performs	actual	DPDK	initialization/finalization.	
The	 five	 OCALLs	 are	 invoked	 only	 on	 SEC-IDS	
startup	 and	 teardown	 and	 do	 not	 affect	
performance.	
Challenge	4:	Trusted	clock.	After	we	separated	
enclavized	Snort®	and	untrusted	DPDK	threads,	
we	made	sure	no	system	calls	were	issued	by	the	
application.	 To	 our	 surprise,	 the	 overhead	 of	
SEC-IDS	over	vanilla	Snort®	still	was	1,000%!	
Upon	 further	 examination,	 we	 noticed	 an	
unusually	 high	 number	 of	 enclave	 exists	 and	
resumes.	 Graphene-SGX	 exits	 the	 enclave	 only	
on	system	calls,	but	we	observed	none	via	strace,	
so	what	was	happening?	
The	 root	 cause	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 the	
`clock_gettime`	 system	 call.	 In	 usual	
environments,	`clock_gettime`	is	virtualized	with	
vDSO	library,	i.e.,	instead	of	context-switching	to	
the	 kernel,	 this	 system	 call	 is	 resolved	 in	 user	
space	 via	 the	 `rdtsc`	 instruction.	 In	 Graphene-
SGX,	 since	 `rdtsc`	 is	disallowed	 inside	enclaves,	
`clock_gettime`	 is	 treated	 as	 a	 syscall:	 upon	 its	
invocation,	 Graphene-SGX	 exits	 the	 enclave,	
executes	 the	 virtualized	 version	 outside,	 and	
resumes	 secure	 execution.	 Thus,	 we	 observe	
many	enclave	exits	(that	degrade	performance)	
but	no	actual	system	calls.	
Snort®	heavily	relies	on	` clock_gettime`,	invoking	
it	 at	 least	 twice	 for	 each	 packet:	 it	 is	 used	 to	
measure	 timeouts,	 TCP/UDP	 flow	 expirations,	
packet	 latencies,	 and	 passage	 of	 time	 for	
statistics.	 Thus,	 we	 could	 not	 eliminate	 this	
syscall	 and	 had	 to	 find	 a	 performant	
workaround.	 Note	 that	 if	 we	 would	 execute	
`rdtsc`	outside	and	pass	the	resulting	clock	back	
to	the	enclave,	we	would	be	susceptible	to	Iago	
attacks	 (the	hacker	 could	easily	 subvert	 Snort®	
execution	by	providing	bogus	time	values).	
In	 the	 end,	 we	 settled	 for	 a	 “trusted-clock”	
thread,	 technique	 described	 in	 the	 “Malware	
Guard	 Extension”	 paper	 [15].	 We	 introduce	 a	
helper	“clock”	thread	in	Graphene-SGX	that	runs	
inside	 the	 enclave	 and	 infinitely	 increments	 a	
global	 variable.	 Additionally,	 we	 stubbed	
`clock_gettime`	to	read	the	value	of	this	variable,	
adjust	it	to	our	CPU’s	speed,	and	return	time	in	
microseconds.	This	simple	technique	provides	a	
“good	 enough”	 relative	 time	 source	 for	 our	
purposes.	Details	can	be	found	in	Appendix	2.	
5. Implementation	Details	
We	 used	 the	 following	 versions	 of	 software:	
Intel®	 DPDK	 17.05.1,	 Intel®	 SGX	 Driver	 v1.9	
(commit	 3abcf82),	 Graphene-SGX	 commit	
4d8eacd,	 Napatech’s	 fork	 of	 LibDAQ	 v2.2.1	
Software	 Total	LoC	 Changed	LoC	
Snort®	
			Snort®	binary	
			LibDAQ	
			hwloc	
			other	libs	
			total	
228,633	
40,523	
40,397	
701,234	
1,010,787	
27	(0.02%)	
1,205	(3%)	
N/A	*	
0	(0%)	
1,232	(0.12%)	
Graphene-SGX	
			Graphene	binary	
			new	OCALLs	
			clock	thread	
			total	
1,233,484	
157	
21	
1,233,662	
0	(0%)	
157	(100%)	
21	(100%)	
178	(0.01%)	
Table	3:	Lines	of	code	in	all	used	software.	
*	hwloc	was	removed	from	dependencies.	
	11	
	
(commit	7c40e02),	Snort3	tag	BUILD_239,	LuaJIT	
v5.1,	PCRE	v8.41,	zlib	v1.2.11,	OpenSSL	v1.1.0.	
All	 changes	 in	 Snort®	 and	 Graphene-SGX	 are	
summarized	 in	 Table	 3.	 We	 expand	 on	 the	
changes	below.	
In	Snort®	codebase,	we	modified	27	LoC	in	one	
file	 (`thread_config.cc`)	 to	 disable	 the	
dependency	on	hwloc.	
In	Napatech’s	LibDAQ,	we	modified	1,205	LoC	in	
one	 file	 (`daq_dpdk.c`)	 to	 introduce	 the	 ECALL	
interface	 and	 add	 more	 functionality	 like	 RSS-
based	 mapping	 to	 Snort®	 threads.	 For	
experiments,	 we	 also	 added	 code	 to	 manually	
pin	Snort®	threads	to	physical	cores.	
In	Graphene-SGX,	we	made	several	changes:	(1)	
one-line	 change	 to	 support	 `MAP_32BIT`,	 (2)	
adapted	 the	 build	 system	 to	 link	 against	
untrusted	LibDAQ	and	DPDK,	(3)	added	157	LoC	
for	five	OCALLs,	and	(4)	added	21	LoC	for	trusted-
clock	thread.	
Graphene-SGX	 requires	 all	 its	 dependencies	 to	
be	 built	 with	 `-fPIC`	 flag	 (as	 position-
independent	 libraries).	 We	 added	 this	 flag	 to	
DPDK	and	LibDAQ	builds	and	observed	no	drop	
in	performance.	For	enclavized	Snort®	build,	we	
link	 it	 against	 the	 “dummy”	 LibDAQ	 that	 only	
redirects	function	calls	to	the	outside	LibDAQ	via	
OCALLs.	
We	identified	and	fixed	a	multithreading	bug	in	
Graphene-SGX	that	led	to	premature	exhaustion	
of	 enclave	 thread	 slots.	 We	 also	 added	 an	
`exit_group`	 syscall	 to	 terminate	 all	 process	
threads	 –	 this	 was	 needed	 to	 kill	 our	 trusted-
clock	thread.	Finally,	we	observed	an	infrequent	
data	race	somewhere	in	the	memory-allocation	
logic	of	Graphene,	but	could	not	pinpoint	its	root	
cause.	
6. Evaluation	
In	 our	 evaluation,	 we	 aim	 to	 answer	 the	
following	questions:	
• What	 is	 the	 overhead	 of	 SEC-IDS	 with	
respect	 to	 vanilla	 Snort®	 in	 terms	 of	
achievable	throughput?	
• What	is	the	effect	of	the	packet	size	and	
the	number	of	flows	in	workload?	
• What	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 number	 of	
rules,	enabled	functionality,	and	logging	
in	Snort®	configuration?	
• What	is	the	scalability	of	SEC-IDS?	
System	platform.	We	use	two	servers	connected	
via	 a	 10Gbps	 NIC.	 Each	 server	 has	 an	 Intel®	
Xeon®	 CPU	 E3-1270	 v5	 @	 3.60GHz	 with	 one	
socket,	 4	 physical	 cores	 and	 hyper-threading	
disabled,	64GB	of	DDR4	2133Mhz	RAM,	8MB	L3	
cache,	 256KB	 per-core	 L2	 cache,	 and	 32KB	
instruction	and	data	per-core	L1	caches.	The	NIC	
is	X710	for	10GbE	SFP+	1572,	and	we	use	vfio-pci	
DPDK	driver.	We	use	Ubuntu	16.04	with	kernel	
v4.4.0.	 We	 assign	 16	 1GB-sized	 HugePages	
(totaling	16GB	of	RAM)	and	pin	DPDK	and	Snort®	
threads	 to	 dedicated	 cores.	 For	 workload	
generation,	we	use	Intel®	PktGen	v3.4.0.	
Methodology.	We	ran	experiments	on	our	SEC-
IDS	as	well	as	vanilla	Snort®.	By	vanilla	Snort®	we	
mean	the	Snort®+DPDK	version	with	LibDAQ	and	
DPDK	code	as	described	above	but	without	SGX	
enclaves	(and	thus	without	Graphene-SGX).	We	
use	default	configuration	file	of	Snort®	and	the	
set	 of	 rules	 `community.rules`	 from	 the	official	
web-site.	We	also	use	the	default	build	system	of	
Snort®.	
We	use	two	workload	scenarios:	synthesized	and	
real-pcap	 ones.	 Synthesized	 workloads	 are	
TCP/IP	packets	with	random	payloads	generated	
by	 PktGen.	 We	 vary	 packet	 sizes	 from	 64B	 to	
1024B,	 number	of	 simultaneous	network	 flows	
(TCP	 connections)	 from	 256	 to	 32,000,	 and	
number	 of	 Snort®	 rules	 used	 for	 pattern	
matching	 from	 0	 to	 3462	 (all	 rules	 in	
`community.rules`).	 Note	 that	 the	 number	 of	
flows	in	a	real	network	is	much	higher,	typically	
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millions	of	simultaneous	flows;	however,	PktGen	
segfaulted	on	more	than	32,000	flows.		
We	 also	 use	 three	 real	 PCAP	 workloads,	
downloaded	 from	 Tcpreplay.8	 The	
characteristics	of	these	workloads	are	as	follows:	
(1)	 `test.pcap`	 contains	 141	 packets	 with	 37	
flows	 and	 average	 packet	 size	 445B,	 (2)	
`smallFlows.pcap`	contains	14,261	packets	with	
1,209	 flows	and	average	packet	 size	646B,	 and	
(3)	 `bigFlows.pcap`	 contains	 791,615	 packets	
with	40,686	flows	and	average	packet	size	449B.	
These	 three	workloads	 stress	 Snort®	 rules	 and	
output	real	alerts.	
Each	 experiment	 is	 run	 for	 2	minutes:	we	 first	
initialize	 PktGen	 and	 start	 sending	 workload	
packets	(PktGen	repeats	packets	if	it	reaches	the	
end	of	a	PCAP	file),	then	start	Snort®,	wait	for	2	
minutes,	 send	 a	 SIGINT	 signal	 to	 Snort®	 to	
gracefully	 terminate,	 log	all	 Snort®	output,	and	
stop	PktGen.	Snort®	output	contains	statistics	on	
																																								 																				
8	http://tcpreplay.appneta.com/wiki/captures.html	
packets	received,	analyzed,	and	allowed,	as	well	
as	throughput	numbers.	We	use	these	statistics	
to	draw	our	plots.	Appendix	3	has	details	on	how	
exactly	we	run	Snort®	and	PktGen.	
Each	 experiment	was	 run	 three	 times,	 and	we	
use	 a	 standard	 mean	 across	 three	 runs.	 The	
standard	error	is	less	than	1%	in	all	experiments.	
Results	with	synthesized	workloads.	Figures	5-7	
show	 Snort®	 throughput	 with	 varied	 packet	
sizes,	number	of	flows,	and	number	of	rules.	
One	 immediate	 thing	 to	 note:	 in	 many	 cases,	
SEC-IDS	 performs	 slightly	 better	 than	 vanilla	
Snort®.	The	reason	is	our	trusted-clock	thread	in	
the	 Intel®	SGX	version;	 the	vanilla	 version	uses	
regular	 `rdtsc`.	 The	 trusted-clock	 mechanism	
induces	a	lower	latency	per	`rdtsc`,	thus	SEC-IDS	
executes	 `clock_gettime`	 slightly	 faster	 than	
vanilla.	
	
Figure	5:	Throughput	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	packet	size.	
	Figure	6:	Throughput	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	number	of	TCP	flows.	
	Figure	7:	Throughput	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	number	of	rules	(max	3462).	
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We	chose	to	show	four	extreme	points	for	each	
varied	 parameter.	 For	 example,	 Figure	 5	 has	
packet	size	on	X-axis	and	four	combinations	of	#	
flows	 and	 #	 rules.	 On	 Figure	 5a,	 we	 show	 the	
“performant”	configuration	with	a	 tiny	number	
of	flows	(256)	and	no	rules	at	all	(i.e.,	no	pattern	
matching).	This	configuration	clearly	has	the	best	
performance	 for	 both	 Snort®	 and	 SEC-IDS:	 the	
state	that	Snort®	keeps	is	very	small	because	the	
number	of	flows	is	very	small.	The	processing	per	
packet	 is	 very	 fast	 because	 there	 is	 no	pattern	
matching.	 On	 Figure	 5d,	 we	 see	 another	
extreme:	Snort®’s	state	is	large	(up	to	620MB	for	
one	thread	and	812MB	for	two	threads)	because	
there	are	32K	flows	and	processing	per	packet	is	
slow	 because	 it	 requires	 matching	 of	 all	 3462	
rules.	 Figures	 5b	 and	 5c	 show	 intermediate	
points:	with	many	 flows	 but	 no	 rules	 and	with	
tiny	number	of	flows	but	all	rules.	Figures	6	and	
7	follow	the	same	pattern.	
It	 is	 clear	 that	 increasing	 packet	 sizes	 also	
increase	 throughput	 of	 both	 vanilla	 and	 SGX	
Snort®.	As	the	packet	size	increases,	the	ratio	of	
Snort®	processing	to	“bytes	received”	decreases.	
In	other	words,	 the	overhead	 is	determined	by	
	
Figure	8:	Throughput	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	without	and	with	configuration	file	(increasing	packet	sizes).	
	
Figure	9:	Throughput	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	without	and	with	outputting	alerts	(increasing	packet	sizes).	
	Figure	10:	Throughput	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	real-world	PCAP	traces	(increasing	number	of	rules).	
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the	number	of	packets	and	not	by	the	number	of	
bytes	per	packet.	
Figure	 6	 indicates	 that	 increasing	 number	 of	
flows	 has	 no	 effect	 on	 vanilla	 Snort®	 but	
hampers	performance	of	SEC-IDS.	It	hints	at	the	
Intel®	 SGX	 limitation:	 storing	 a	 flow	 in	 Snort®	
requires	 2-4KB	 of	 memory,	 and	 while	 vanilla	
Snort®	 is	 not	 limited	 by	 RAM,	 SEC-IDS	 quickly	
exhausts	 the	 EPC	 size	 and	 requires	 expensive	
EPC	paging.	This	is	proved	by	the	CPU	utilization	
of	 the	 Intel®	 SGX	 swapping	 daemon	
(ksgxswapd):	with	32,000	flows	it	peaks	to	12%	
for	two	threads	and	24%	for	three	threads	(while	
in	other	cases	it	is	zero).	We	also	notice	that	SEC-
IDS	performs	well	with	one	thread	but	suffocates	
with	two	threads,	clearly	seen	on	Figures	6b	and	
6d.	 This	 is	 because	 two	 Snort®	 threads	 do	 not	
share	 any	 state	 and	 thus	 require	 (partial)	
duplication	of	memory.	
Figure	7	shows	the	impact	of	the	number	of	rules.	
We	take	first	N	rules	from	the	`community.rules`	
file	 for	 this	 experiment,	 with	 the	maximum	 of	
3,462	 rules.	 Here	 we	 observe	 that	 throughput	
drops	slightly	in	both	vanilla	and	SGX	Snort®,	but	
there	is	no	difference	between	vanilla	and	Intel®	
SGX	versions	(clearly	seen	on	Figure	7c).	This	 is	
understandable:	the	whole	set	of	rules	occupies	
only	28MB	and	does	not	stress	memory.	
Finally,	we	can	compare	1-thread	and	2-threads	
versions	 on	 Figures	 5-7.	 Vanilla	 Snort®	 shows	
perfectly	 scalability,	 doubling	 its	 throughput	
when	 moving	 from	 a	 single	 thread	 to	 two	
threads.	SEC-IDS	has	a	more	complex	behavior.	
With	a	small	number	of	flows,	SEC-IDS	also	scales	
perfectly.	 However,	 as	 the	 number	 of	 flows	
increases,	the	scalability	of	SEC-IDS	declines;	this	
is	 seen	 especially	 in	 Figures	 6b	 and	 6d.	 We	
highlighted	the	reasons	for	this	above.	
As	 an	 additional	 experiment,	we	 looked	 at	 the	
effect	 of	 the	 configuration	 file.	 Figure	 8	 shows	
two	plots:	without	a	configuration	file	on	the	left	
and	with	it	on	the	right.	Running	Snort®	without	
configuration	 means	 that	 it	 does	 not	 perform	
any	 preprocessing	 or	 analysis	 of	 packets:	 it	
simply	 fetches	 packets	 from	 the	 RX	 ring	 and	
immediately	 allows	 them	 (aka	 useless	 mode).	
Clearly,	without	any	processing,	Snort®	does	not	
keep	any	state	and	has	almost-zero	 latency	 for	
each	packet.	As	soon	as	we	add	the	configuration	
file,	 Snort®	 runs	 at	 full	 capacity,	 and	
performance	 drops	 for	 both	 vanilla	 and	 Intel®	
SGX	 versions.	 Note	 that	 Intel®	 SGX	 version	
performs	poorly	in	Figure	8b	because	we	stress	
it	with	32,000	flows.	
Figure	9	shows	the	effect	of	enabling	alerts,	i.e.,	
showing	 them	 in	 the	 console.	 There	 is	 no	
performance	 degradation	 for	 both	 vanilla	 and	
SGX	Snort®	except	one	case:	SEC-IDS	is	4X	worse	
with	 alerts	 on	 1024B	 packets	 and	 2	 threads	
(right-most	 bar).	 This	 is	 again	 due	 to	 the	 EPC	
paging:	at	this	point,	`ksgxswapd`	CPU	utilization	
jumps	from	25%	to	30%.	
Finally,	we	experimented	with	 three	 real-world	
PCAP	 traces:	 test	 (very	 small,	 only	 37	 flows),	
small	 (1,209	 flows),	 and	 big	 (40,686	 flows).	
Figure	10	shows	the	results,	with	the	increasing	
number	 of	 rules.	 Similar	 to	 observations	 on	
synthesized	 workloads,	 SEC-IDS	 performance	
overhead	 is	a	 function	of	 the	number	of	 flows:	
with	a	`big`	PCAP	and	two	threads,	throughput	is	
roughly	halved.	
In	general,	we	conclude	that	the	only	source	of	
performance	 degradation	 of	 SEC-IDS	 is	 the	
limited	EPC	size.	This	is	clear	when	we	stress	the	
system	 with	 32,000	 flows	 and	 a	 2-threads	
configuration.	 In	 low-memory-footprint	 cases,	
SEC-IDS	performs	very	similar	to	vanilla	Snort®.	
Additional	plots	can	be	found	in	Appendix	4.	
7. Related	Work	
Intel®	SGX-enabled	middle	boxes.	The	benefits	
of	 Intel®	 SGX	 for	 network	 middleboxes	 were	
explored	 in	 previous	works,	 though	 never	 at	 a	
scale	 of	 IDS’s	 [7—9,23].	 For	 example,	 LightBox	
[7]	introduces	a	new	framework	for	Intel®	SGX-
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enabled	 network	 functions,	 with	 secure	
configuration	 and	 data	 channels	 and	 a	 smart	
state	cache	to	reduce	the	negative	impact	of	EPC	
paging.	 In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 TrustedClick	 [8]	 and	
Slick	 [9]	 add	 secure	 communication	 channels	
with	 remote	 attestation	 to	 the	 existing	 Click	
architecture.	 None	 of	 these	 projects	 aims	 to	
support	 unmodified	 complex	 IDS’s	 such	 as	
Snort®.	
S-NFV	 [23]	 manually	 separates	 only	 the	 state-
handling	 code	 and	 data	 (kept	 in	 the	 enclave)	
from	the	rest	of	application.	As	one	case	study,	
S-NFV	modifies	 Snort®	 to	 keep	 tag	 state	 in	 the	
enclave:	 the	 results	 indicate	 huge	 developer	
effort	 and	 high	 overheads	 for	 a	 small	 piece	 of	
functionality.	 It	 is	 unclear	 how	 this	 approach	
scales	to	flow	states	and	stream	reassembly,	as	
well	 as	 what	 security	 implications	 result	 from	
leaving	most	of	Snort®	code	and	data	outside	of	
enclave.	
IDS’s	and	Snort®.	Research	on	IDS’s	and	Snort®	
in	particular	 gained	a	 lot	of	 attention	 from	 the	
security	 community.	 To	 the	 best	 of	 our	
knowledge,	 all	 these	 efforts	 concerned	
increasing	 performance	 and	 not	 security	 of	
Snort®.	For	example,	Kargus	reengineers	Snort®	
using	 (1)	 batch	 processing	 at	 all	 stages	 and	 (2)	
CPU-GPU	 parallel	 execution	 for	 pattern	
matching	[24].	Similarly,	GASPP	rewrites	Snort®	
to	 run	 completely	 on	 GPUs	 for	 performance	
benefit	[25].	We	are	not	aware	of	any	attempts	
to	harden	complete	Snort®	for	security.	
Intel®	 SGX-enabled	 network	 applications.	 The	
work	closest	to	ours	 in	spirit	 is	 the	recent	SGX-
Tor	 [21].	 Similar	 to	 our	 work,	 SGX-Tor	 moves	
security-critical	 functionality	 of	 the	 Tor	
anonymity	network	application	 inside	an	 Intel®	
SGX	enclave.	Unlike	our	work,	SGX-Tor	modifies	
a	significant	3.4%	(or	11,078	LoC)	of	the	original	
code	 and	 uses	 the	 Intel®	 SGX	 SDK	 for	 manual	
separation.	Finally,	SGX-Tor	proves	that	a	smart	
partitioning	 into	 enclave	 and	 untrusted	 parts	
leads	to	low	performance	overheads	of	4-12%.	
8. Lessons	Learned	
Support	 for	 manual	 separation	 in	 shielded	
execution	 frameworks.	 Our	 Snort®	 case	 study	
highlights	 an	 interesting	 hybrid	 of	 unmodified	
execution	 and	manual	 separation.	 On	 the	 one	
hand,	 it	 would	 be	 tedious	 and	 error-prone	 to	
reorganize	 a	 mature	 application	 like	 Snort®	 to	
use	 Intel®	 SGX	 enclaves,	 thus	 a	 shielded	
execution	framework	is	a	natural	choice.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	developer	might	want	to	tweak	
the	 application	 to	 achieve	 better	 performance	
by	moving	some	parts	outside	of	the	enclave.	
Based	 on	 our	 experience	 with	 manual	 Snort®-
DPDK	 separation	 in	 Graphene-SGX,	 we	 believe	
that	 a	 generic	 extension	 to	 add	 application-
specific	OCALLs	would	be	beneficial	and	easy	to	
implement.	Even	in	our	case,	with	Graphene-SGX	
not	designed	for	manual	OCALLs,	we	were	able	
to	 achieve	 clear	 separation	 in	 only	 157	 LoC.	
Expanding	 Graphene-SGX	 and	 probably	
combining	it	with	the	flexibility	of	the	Intel®	SGX	
SDK	would	be	a	step	in	the	right	direction.	
Manual	separation	at	the	library	interface.	Our	
experience	 with	 Snort®	 and	 LibDAQ	 proves	 an	
apparent	intuition:	separation	between	enclave	
and	 untrusted	 code/data	 is	 easy	 at	 the	 library	
interface.	 Libraries	 are	 designed	 to	 be	 self-
contained	and	 to	expose	only	 a	minimal	 set	of	
functions.	 This	 provides	 an	 obvious	 choice	 for	
OCALLs.	 Additionally,	 libraries	 usually	 expose	
their	state	in	a	well-defined	set	of	struct-objects;	
this	 shared	 state	 is	 allocated	 by	 the	 library	
outside	 of	 the	 enclave	 and	 the	 pointer	 to	 it	
should	be	passed	to	the	enclave.	
Performance	 limitations	 of	 current	 Intel®	 SGX	
servers	are	temporary.	Many	current	limitations	
–	 small	 EPC	 size,	 unavailability	 of	 the	 `rdtsc`	
instruction	 –	 will	 be	 addressed	 in	 future	
implementations	of	Intel®	SGX.	Our	work	on	SEC-
IDS	 indicates	 that	 there	 will	 be	 no	 tangible	
performance	loss	once	the	EPC	size	is	sufficiently	
large.	
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Appendix	1:	Snort®	Rules	
Snort®	rules	are	used	to	detect	anomalies	in	the	
network,	malicious	packets,	and	hacker	attacks.	
Most	 Snort®	 rules	 are	 written	 as	 regular	
expressions	 with	 additional	 protocol/flow	
properties	 attached.	 Rules	 that	 are	 more	
complicated	 are	 written	 in	 C++	 or	 Lua	 and	
distributed	with	Snort®	or	as	separate	plugins.	
Sets	of	rules	are	compiled	in	a	single	file	loaded	
at	 Snort®	 startup.	 These	 files	 can	 be	 freely	
downloaded	from	an	official	Snort®	web-site	(so-
called	 “community”	 rules).	 There	 are	 also	 paid	
rule	 subscriptions	 that	 are	 updated	 more	
frequently	and	contain	extra	rules.	In	this	work,	
we	use	the	“community.rules”	file.	
As	 of	 date	 of	 this	 writing,	 the	 community	 set	
contains	3,462	rules.	A	typical	rule	is	a	one-liner	
that	looks	as	follows:	
alert	tcp	$HOME_NET	[21,	25,	443,	465,	636,	992,	993,	995,	
2484]	->	$EXTERNAL_NET	any	(msg:	"OpenSSL	SSLv3	large	
heartbeat	 response	 -	 possible	 ssl	 heartbleed	 attempt";	
flow:	to_client,	established,	only_stream;			content:	"|18	03	
00|",	 depth	 3;	 	 	 byte_test:	 2,>,128,0,relative;	 metadata:	
policy	 balanced-ips	 drop,	 policy	 security-ips	 drop,	 ruleset	
community;	 service:	 ssl;	 reference:	 cve,2014-0160;	
classtype:	attempted-recon;	sid:	30514;	rev:	9;	)	
The	above	rule	detects	a	Heartbleed	attack	and	
generates	an	alert	with	a	message	`msg`.	Snort®	
will	 examine	 all	 TCP	 packets	with	 source	 ports	
21,	25,	443,	etc.	(typical	ports	that	use	SSL/TLS)	
that	 are	 sent	 to	 client	 over	 an	 established	
connection,	with	first	3	bytes	containing	`18	03	
00`	(message	type)	and	the	next	2	being	greater	
than	 “128”	 (i.e.,	 payload	 length	 is	 greater	 than	
128	 bytes	 –	 indication	 of	 Heartbleed).	
Additionally,	the	rule	instructs	to	drop	the	packet	
if	in	Intrusion	Prevention	(inline)	mode.	The	rest	
fields	indicate	CVE	of	vulnerability,	rule	set,	and	
rule	SID	and	version.	
Appendix	2:	Trusted-clock	Thread	
We	implemented	the	trusted-clock	thread	using	
the	 following	 assembly	 code.	 We	 changed	
Graphene-SGX	 to	 start	 an	 additional	 enclave	
thread	 that	 infinitely	 executes	
`clock_thread_main`.	The	`trusted_clock`	global	
variable	serves	as	a	time	source.	
volatile	long	unsigned	trusted_clock;	
int	clock_thread_main(void*	unused)	{	
				trusted_clock	=	0;	
				asm	volatile	(	
												"mov	%0,	%%rcx\n\t"	
												"mov	(%%rcx),	%%rax\n\t"	
												"1:	inc	%%rax\n\t"	
												"			mov	%%rax,	(%%rcx)\n\t"	
												"			jmp	1b"	
												:	/*	no	output	operands	*/	
												:	"r"(&trusted_clock)	
												:	"%rax",	"%rcx",	"cc"	
												);	
				return	0;	
}	
We	 patch	 the	 `ocall_gettime`	 system	 call	 to	
access	 `trusted_clock`	 and	 adjust	 it	 to	 return	
time	in	microseconds.	
int	ocall_gettime	(unsigned	long	*	microsec)	{	
				#define	CPUFREQ	3785.0	
				extern	volatile	long	unsigned	trusted_clock;	
				*microsec	=	(long	unsigned)	(trusted_clock/CPUFREQ);	
				return	0;	
}	
For	our	prototype,	we	skipped	the	issues	around	
integer	 overflow	 and	 clock	 drift.	 We	 also	
hardcode	 the	 coefficient	 `CPUFREQ`	 for	
adjustment	 to	 reflect	 our	 particular	 machine.	
Note	a	subtle	security	implication:	the	malicious	
OS	 can	 preempt	 the	 clock	 thread	 at	 will	 and	
artificially	 slow	 down	 the	 passage	 of	 time.	
However,	the	OS	cannot	revert	passage	of	time,	
since	the	counter	only	monotonically	increases.	
We	 consider	 our	 clock-thread	 feature	 a	
temporary	 workaround,	 since	 ultimately	 the	
`rdtsc`	 issue	 should	 be	 fixed	 in	 Intel®	 SGX	
hardware.	
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Appendix	3:	Commands	for	Experiments	
First,	 we	 modified	 the	 GRUB2	 boot	 loader’s	
settings	for	Linux:	
GRUB_CMDLINE_LINUX	 =	 "default_hugepagesz=1GB	
hugepagesz=1G	hugepages=16	iommu=pt	intel_iommu=on	
intel_idle.max_cstate=0	 intel_pstate=disable	 isolcpus=2-3	
nohz_full=2-3"	
In	particular,	we	instruct	Linux	to	dedicate	16GB	
of	RAM	to	16	1GB-sized	HugePages,	 to	use	SR-
IOV	pass-through	(pt)	mode,	to	disable	C-states	
(low-power	modes),	and	to	 isolate	CPU	cores	2	
and	3	(i.e.,	no	scheduling	of	 interrupts	or	other	
processes	 on	 these	 two	 cores).	 We	 then	
manually	pin	Snort®	threads	to	cores	2	and	3.	
A	 typical	 command	 to	 run	 PktGen	 with	 a	
synthesized	workload	looks	as	follows:	
sudo	 pktgen	 -l	 0-1	 -n	 2	 -m	 4096	 --	 -P	 -m	 1.0	 -f	
test_64B_256F.lua	
The	 command	 initializes	 PktGen	 to	 run	GUI	 on	
core	 0,	 one	 DPDK	 thread	 on	 core	 1	 (handling	
RX/TX	 queues	 on	 port	 0),	 with	 2	 memory	
channels	 and	 4GB	 of	 HugePages	 RAM.	 PktGen	
enables	 promiscuous	 mode	 on	 all	 ports	 and	
reads	 parameters	 of	 the	 workload	 from	 file	
`test_64B_256F.lua`.	 This	 file	 contains	 a	 Lua	
script	 to	 start	 sending	 64B	 packets	 in	 256	 TCP	
flows	on	port	0.		
A	 typical	 command	 to	 run	PktGen	with	a	PCAP		
workload	looks	very	similar:	
sudo	pktgen	-l	0-1	-n	2	-m	4096	--	-P	-m	1.0	-f	test_start.lua	
-s	0:smallFlows.pcap	
Here	 we	 add	 `-s`	 to	 specify	 that	 we	 want	 to	
stream	 contents	 of	 a	 PCAP	 file	 on	 port	 0.	 The	
script	`test_start.lua`	simply	starts	transmission.	
A	typical	command	to	run	Snort®	or	SEC-IDS:	
sudo	-E	LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"	snort®	--
daq	dpdk	-i	dpdk0	--daq-var	dpdk_args="-n	2	-l	1	-m	4096"	
–z	3	–c	snort®.conf	–R	community_100.rules	–A	fast	
The	 command	 executes	 Snort®	 with	 root	
privileges	 and	 passes	 `LD_LIBRARY_PATH`	
(required	 to	 find	 library	 dependencies).	 The	
arguments	 instruct	 Snort®	 to	 use	 `dpdk`	 DAQ	
module	 and	 call	 interface	 `dpdk0`	 (by	
convention).	 DPDK	 arguments	 are	 specified	 In	
`dpdk_args`	 and	are	 similar	 to	 the	ones	above.	
We	 also	 specify	 three	 threads	 to	 run	 (one	 for	
DPDK,	 two	 for	 Snort®),	 configuration	 file	
`snort®.conf`,	 rules	 file	 `community_100.rules`	
with	100	rules,	and	the	`fast`	alert	output.	
Appendix	4:	Additional	Experiments	
For	completeness,	we	report	evaluation	results	
for	percentage	of	dropped	and	analyzed	packets.	
Figures	 4.1	 –	 4.5	 show	 the	 percentage	 of	
dropped	 packets	 as	 reported	 by	 DPDK.	 Vanilla	
Snort®	almost	never	drops	packets,	i.e.,	the	rate	
of	network	packets’	consumption	is	higher	than	
the	 capacity	 of	 the	 DPDK	 receive	 queue.	
Surprisingly,	 SEC-IDS	drops	5-20%	of	packets	 in	
all	 configurations	 –	 except	 the	 “useless	mode”	
without	a	configuration	file	at	all	–	without	any	
particular	 pattern	 or	 cause.	 Upon	 further	
investigation,	 it	 turned	 out	 that	 the	 startup	
phase	 of	 SEC-IDS	 (first	 6-9	 seconds	 of	 its	
execution)	 saw	drop	 rates	 close	 to	100%	while	
during	the	normal	execution	the	drop	rate	never	
exceeded	1%.	 This	 behavior	 is	 understandable:	
during	 startup,	SEC-IDS	actively	 swaps	pages	 in	
and	 out,	 with	 the	 Intel®	 SGX	 paging	 daemon	
`ksgxswapd`	consuming	5-50%	of	CPU	time.	See	
Appendix	5	for	example	statistics.	
Figures	 4.6	 –	 4.10	 show	 the	 percentage	 of	
analyzed	 packets	 as	 reported	 by	 Snort®.	 These	
figures	 exhibit	 the	 same	 patterns	 as	 our	 main	
evaluation	(Figures	5—10).	In	general,	by	adding	
more	 Snort®	 threads,	 it	 would	 be	 possible	 to	
analyze	 100%	 packets.	 We	 project	 that	 8-10	
Snort®	threads	and	a	single	DPDK	thread	would	
be	 sufficient	 to	 saturate	 a	 10Gbps	 link	
(conditioned	on	 the	 larger	EPC	size	available	 in	
next-generation	Intel®	SGX	machines).	
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Figure	4.1:	Percentage	of	dropped	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	packet	size.	
Figure	4.2:	Percentage	of	dropped	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	number	of	TCP	flows.	
Figure	4.3:	Percentage	of	dropped	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	number	of	rules	(max	3462).	
	
Figure	4.4:	Percentage	of	dropped	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	without	and	with	configuration	file.	
	
Figure	4.5:	Percentage	of	dropped	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	without	and	with	outputting	alerts.	
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Figure	4.6:	Percentage	of	analyzed	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	packet	size.	
Figure	4.7:	Percentage	of	analyzed	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	number	of	TCP	flows.	
Figure	4.8:	Percentage	of	analyzed	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	with	increasing	number	of	rules	(max	3462).	
	
Figure	4.9:	Percentage	of	analyzed	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	without	and	with	configuration	file.	
	
Figure	4.10:	Percentage	of	analyzed	packets	of	SEC-IDS	and	vanilla	SGX	without	and	with	outputting	alerts.	
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Appendix	 5:	 Example	 of	 Drop	 Rate	 and	
CPU	Utilization	
As	shown	in	Appendix	4	and	Figures	4.1-4.5,	the	
drop	 rate	of	 SEC-IDS	 is	 very	high,	 ranging	 from	
5%	 to	20%.	Our	 suspicion	was	 that	 the	 startup	
phase	of	SEC-IDS	caused	the	skew	in	the	number	
of	 dropped	 packets.	 The	 root	 cause	 is	 that	 at	
startup,	 the	 enclave	 needs	 to	 initialize	 a	 lot	 of	
code	and	data,	which	leads	to	a	high	rate	of	EPC	
paging.	The	following	table	shows	one	example	
run	with	a	3-second	breakdown	of	(1)	drop	rate	
and	 (2)	 CPU	 utilization	 of	 EPC	 paging,	 i.e.,	
`ksgxswapd`.	
To	remove	this	skew	from	the	drop	rate	Figures	
4.1-4.5,	 we	 could	 re-design	 our	 experiments	
such	that	SEC-IDS	is	first	started,	warmed	up	for	
several	 seconds,	 and	 only	 then	 is	 loaded	 by	
PktGen.	 Fortunately,	 our	 current	 numbers	 on	
throughput	 (Figures	5-10)	are	still	 correct	since	
these	statistics	were	collected	by	Snort®	after	it	
went	into	steady	state.	
	
	
Second	 Drop	rate,	%	 ksgxswapd	
CPU	utilization,	%	
0	 0.0	 0.0	
3	 100.0	 49.3	
6	 100.0	 19.7	
9	 0.95	 0.0	
12	 0.21	 4.7	
15	 0.78	 3.0	
18	 0.15	 27.2	
21	 0.0	 0.0	
24	 0.0	 0.0	
27	 0.0	 0.0	
30	 0.0	 0.0	
33	 0.0	 0.0	
36	 0.0	 0.0	
39	 0.0	 0.0	
42	 0.28	 0.0	
45	 0.0	 0.0	
48	 0.0	 0.0	
51	 0.90	 0.0	
54	 0.79	 0.0	
57	 0.67	 0.0	
60	 0.98	 0.0	
Table	5.1:	Example	run	for	the	SEC-IDS	configuration:	
2	threads,	1024B	packet	size,	256	flows,	3462	rules.	
